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STATE of Utah, Petitioner,
•

•.

.

:

,

v . ,

>•.

Anne M. STIRBA, Judge, Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County,
Utah, Respondent;

4. Mandamus <S=>4(4)
•'• StState was entitled to seek relief in nature of writ of mandamus from trial judge's
order limiting restitution in criminal case
because it lacked authority to take statutory
appeal from restitution order. U.C.A.1953,
77-18a-l(2); Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 65B(d)(4).

Laura M. Morrison, Irttervehor.

o

No. 981383-CA
Court of Appeals of Utah.af,;
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p
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State could not use writ of mandamus to
circumvent restriction against appealing orders of restitution, and thus was not entitled
to same scope of review available on statutory appeal. U.C.A.1953, 77-18a-l(2); Rules
;
Civ.Proc.,Rule65B(d)(4).

Dec. 24, 1998.

5. Criminal Law <3=>1012
Mandamus <3=>3(7)
0
State commenced (original proceeding)
Vidtims' right to pursue civil damages
Q seeking extraordinary writ in nature of man
— * damus compelling the District Court, Salt against defendant did not provide State with
Lake County, Anne M. Stirba, J., to order plain, speedy and adequate remedy, so ais to
additional restitution in criminal case in preclude State from seeking writ of manda- • which defendant had been convicted of theft mus relief from trial court's order in criminal
by receiving stolen property. The Court of case limiting amount of restitution. Rules
;
;;
Appeals, Orme, J., held that: (1) State did not Civ.Proc, Rule 65B(d)(4).
CO have right to ^appeal restitution order; (2) 6. Mandamus <S=*28
State was eligible; for extraordinary writ reWrit of mandamus relief is available to
lief because of lack of alternative remedy; (3)
direct
exercise of discretionary action, but
judge did not breach her nondiscretionary
statutory duty to, order appropriate restitu- hot to direct the trial court's exercise of
tion, and thus mandamus relief was not avail- judgment or discretion in particular way.
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 65B(d)(2)(B).'
" <'
< able on that basis; and (4) judge's error in
determining that defendant could not be re7. Criminal Law <s>1208.4(2)
quired to pay restitution to victim who has
Sentencing judge had nondiscretionary
been reimbursed by insurance did not qualify
duty
to order defendant to make appropriate
kind of gross and flagrant abuse of discn?
iscreN
restitution. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-201(4)(a)(i).
ion that could support issuance of writ.
8. Criminal Law e=*1208.4(2)
Extraordinary writ denied.
Mandamus <£=>61
u Judge did not breach her nondiscretionary
statutory duty to order appropriate restiCriminal Law <3=>1024(9)
tution, and thus did not provide ground for
State may not appeal orders of restitu- State to obtain mandamus relief on basis thkt
tion. U.C.A.1953, 77-18a-l(2).
she had failfed to perform legally required
act, when she refused to include amounts
2. Criminal Law e=*1024(l)
previously paid by insurance in directing that
Statute setting forth specific judgments defendant compensate victims of car theft for
and orders from which the State may appeal their losses; "criteria and procedures" that
in criminal cases is restrictive rather than trial judge was required to follow in deterDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
mining propriety and amount of restitution
permissive and, thus,
the State has
no contain
right errors.
Machine-generated
OCR, may
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emphasis added); Indian Village Trading
lost, Inc. v. Bench, 929 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah
3t.App.1996) ("Thus, under Rule 65B[], a
)etitioner may seek to . . . compel correction
>f a public officer's gross abuse of discretion
under] Utah R, Civ, P. 65B[ (d)J(2)(A).,,)
citation omitted; emphasis added).

I ^

may appeal in criminal cases, none of which K
^
include restitution orders. See Utah Code ^T ^
Ann. § 77-18a-l(2) (Supp.1998). Although ^
~J
the State brings its Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) claim ^
P
as^ji original action^ this proceeding has the x ^ O
^ame characteristics, and seeks the same re**
view and relief, as would a statutory appeal
from Judge1' Stirba's restitution order.
Hence, to avoid transforming this action into
an impermissible appeal, we must deny the **
State's requester a Rule 65B(d)(2)(A) writ
of mandamus.

3 9
P

[10,11] In this case, Judge Stirba's ruing that "a defendant cannot be required to
>ay restitution : . .••. to a victim who :has aleady been reimbursed by the victim's insur.nce carrier" was an incorrect interpretation
•f the restitution statute then in effect.4
CONCLUSION,.
lowever, a simple mistake of law does not
Based;;on our determination that Judge
[ualify as the kind of j^ros5 and flagrant Stirba neither failed to perform a legally-"""0
,buse of discretion necessary for a Rule required act under Rule 65B,(d)(2)(B),nor Q
SB(d)(2)(A) writ to issue.
...,
^abused
her
discretion) under
Rule
j35B(d)(2)(A),
coupled
with
our
holding
that
[12] Moreover, while courts may find an
buse of discretion and issue a Rule the State's action is tantamount to an imper>5B(d)(2)(A) writ in the face of,a particularly missible appeal, the State's Petition for Exegregious and momentous legal error, see, traordinary Writ'is hereby denied.
.g., Frederick, 890 R2d at 1019-21, the
RUSSELL W. BENCH, Judge, and ;
ourts may not routinely use the writ as a
ubstitute..for, an appeal. . See Merrihew v. JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Judge, concur.
\alt[. Lake, County Planning and Zoning
:omm% 659 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Utah 1983).
'he Legislature has exactingly limited the
udgments ,apd qrders from which the State
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3 1
C 0Q

i

-t

9

r pB

victim. As we noted in State v. Haga, 954 P.2d
1284, 1289 (Utah Ct.App. 1998), Westerman has
no application absent an order specifically requiring that the defendant pay restitution directly
to an insurance company. Accordingly, because
the restitution recipient in this case was to be the
very persons against whom the charged crime
was perpetrated, and not an insurer, Judge Stirba misapplied the Westerman holding in interpreting the restitution statute.
We also note that the Legislature has addressed the substantive issue in this case, i.e., the
propriety of restitution orders for amounts covany natural person against whom the charged
ered by a victim's insurance. Following the
crime or conduct is alleged to have been
Westerman ruling, the Legislature took the Wesperpetrated or attempted by the defendant or
terman court up on its suggestion to "enact reminor personally or as a party to the offense or
medial legislation," 945 P.2d at 695 n. 5, dealing
conduct, or, in the discretion of the court,
with any unintended effects of that decision. See
against whom a related crime or act is alleged
1998 Utah Laws ch. 149, § 1. Hence, effective
to have been perpetrated or attempted.
May 4, 1998, the restitution statute defines "vicUtah Code Ann. §77-38-2(9)(a) (Supp.1997).
tim" as "any person whom the court determines
has suffered, pecuniar}' damages as a result of
Acknowledging that "the result is troublesome,"
the defendant's criminal activities." Utah Code
the Westerman court held that an insurance comAnn. § 76-3-201 (l)(e)(i) (Supp.1998). See Utah
pany does not fair within this definition of "vicCode Ann. § 76-3-20l(4)(a)(i) (Supp.1998). Betim." 945 P.2d at 699. However, the restitution
cause this definition is far less restrictive than
order challenged in Westerman was an order
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
the definition considered in Westerman and cermandating payment of restitution directly to
the
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tainly broad enough to include insurance comna\>irtim\ insurpr.
RpjR id a t 6 9 6 .

. Judge Stirba based her ruling on this court's
holding in State v. Westerman, 945 P.2d 695
(Utah Ct.App.1997), that "an insurance company
is not a victim as defined in [the restitution
statute]" and therefore not entitled to restitution
payments. Id. at 699. However, the restitution
statute applicable when Judge Stirba entered her
ruling provided that "[f]or purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in
Section 77-38-2," Utah Code Ann. § 76-3201(4)(a)(i) (Supp.1997), which section defined
"victim" as
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5. Criminal Law <S=>260.3
Criminal defendant's right to an "appeal" from a court not of record is satisfied
by provision for a trial de novo in a court of
record/ Const. Art. 1, § 12; U.C.A.1953, 785-120; Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 26(12); Judicial Administration Rule 4-608."
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

6. Criminal Law <3=>260.13
On appeal of a conviction from justice
court, the parties essentially get a fresh start
in the form of a trial de novo. U.C.A.1953,
78-5-120; Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 26(12);
Judicial Administration Rule 4-608.
.
7. Criminal Law ^260.11(1)
In an appeal from justice court, district
court is not acting in a typical appellate
capacity; because the justice court is hot a
court of record, the "appeal" does not involve
a review of the justice court proceedings
which result in a judgment U.C.A.1953, 785-120; Rules Crim.Proc, Rule 26(12); Judicial Administration Rule 4-608.
7
8. Criminal Law e=>260.12
District court judge's attempt to remand
to justice court a case in which defendant
sought trial de novo was abuse of discretion.
y.C.A.1953, 78-5-120; Rules Cja&Proc,
Rule 65B(d)(2)(A); Judicial Administration
Rule 4-608(2)(E j.
.,

*•'' Joan C7 Watt and Matthew G. Nielsen,
Salt Lake Legal Defender Ass'n, Salt Lake
City, for Petitioner; f
x Brent MiJ Johnson, Salt Lake City, for
Respondent:
u^

OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
111: Pursuant to Rule 65B of the Utah
Rules: of Civil Procedure and Rule 19 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, petitioner Richard Dean asks this court for.an extraordinary writ ordering^ respondent, a
judge of the Third District Court, to reinstate petitioner's appeal from a conviction in
Salt Lake County Justice Court. We grant
the petition.
BACKGROUND
112 Following a bench trial in justice
court, Dean was convicted of shoplifting.
Dean appealed this conviction to the district
court, requesting a trial de novo as authorized by statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 783-4(5) (Supp.1998) ("The district court has
appellate jurisdiction to adjudicate trials de
novo of the judgments of the justice court
. . . ; " ) ; id. § 78-5-120 (Supp.1998) (providing "[a]ny person not satisfied with a judgment rendered in a justice court . . . is entitled to a trial de novo in the district court").
The district court case was assigned to respondent, who scheduled a pretrial conference/When Dean did not appear, respondent continued the pretrial conference to the
following month.
H3 The-next month, Dean again failed to
appear at the pretrial conference. Respondent properly issued a bench warrant for
Dean's arrests However, respondent went
on to dismiss the appeal and remand the case
to the justice court for further proceedings.
De^ri then filed a motion to reinstate the
appeal in the district court, which respondent
denied. Dean now petitions this court to
order respondent to. reinstate his appeal and
to conduct the required trial de novo.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] 114 This case is an original proceeding in this court challenging a judicial action
Jan Graham , Atty.. Gen., and Norman E. under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil
Plate, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for Procedure. Therefore, our scope of review is
Amicus Curiae Utah Attorney General.
limited
and "shall
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark
Law School,
BYU. not extend further than to
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
determine whether the respondent has regu-
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13. A c t i o n <S==>63

the assistant city attorney and the clerk
If litigants ask for extraordinary writs of the court to accompany both himself and
of prohibition and permit other rights to the petitioner to the courtroom. The judge
expire, they do so at their peril.
then took off his hat and coat, convened
the court, found the petitioner guilty of
PRATT, J., dissenting.
';
contempt for having made the remark, and
imposed sentence.
[1] A reference to the applicable statutes and cases in respect to contempts and
procedure for punishing, if committed, will
suffice to dispose of this proceeding. Section 104—45—1, U.C.A., 1943, enumerates
acts and omissions constituting contempt.
The substance of the sections applicable
here are: (1) That disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge
Alternative writ made permanent.
while holding the court tending to interrupt
Edward W. Clyde, of Salt Lake City, for the due course of trial or other judicial
plaintiff..
proceeding are contempts of the authority
Ira A. Huggins, of Ogden, for defend- of the court, and (2) Any other unlawful
ants.
interference with the process or proceedings of the court are likewise contemptuLATIMER, Justice.
ous acts.
•;,-•.•...•
Petitioner instituted original proceedThe facts of this proceeding do not bring
ings in this court to prohibit' defendant the petitioner under the first quoted subJudge of the City Court of Ogden City, section. Admitting, if necessary, that petiUtah, from enforcing a certain judgment tioner's behavior was contemptuous or inholding petitioner in contempt of court and solent, it was expressed while the judge
sentencing him to a fine or term in jail.
and petitioner were either in the elevator
The facts out of which this controversy or just about to enter it. The judge was
arose are these; Petitioner had appeared not holding court, he had already adjournin the City Court of Ogden City to answer ed the morning session, he was on his way
a criminal charge of disturbing the peace. out of the building, and no trial or other
Defendant judge heard the matter, peti- judicial proceedings were then in progress.
tioner was found guilty, and ordered to pay
[2] There is grave doubt that petitiona fine or in the alternative to serve a jail
er's
conduct was such as to constitute a
sentence. Petitioner then left the court-,
violation
of the second provision of the
house and about one-half hour later returned to the office of the city attorney to statute quoted herein. The rule announcpay the fine. He was directed to go to the ed by the Supreme Court of the United
office of the desk sergeant, which was lo- States and by this court is that criticism
cated on the ground floor of the same after final disposition of an action is the
building. The defendant judge had recess- exercise of the right of free speech and
ed court and was preparing to leave the- therefore not contemptuous. See Bridges
building. The judge and petitioner arrived v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252, 62
at the elevator shaft on the fifth floor of S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed. 192, 159 A.L.R. 1346;
the building about the same time, both, Kirkham v. Sweetring, 108 Utah 397, 160
waiting for the elevator and as they P.2d 435. In view of our decision on the
stepped on, the petitioner made the fol- other aspect of this case, it is not necessary
lowing statement: "That is the worst ex- to comment on the contention that the beample of a Kangaroo Court I have ever havior of the petitioner. went beyond the
seen." The judge overheard it, took the limits of criticism.
Digitized by
the Howard
W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
petitioner by the arm, escorted
him
to the
.Section 104—45—3, U.C.A., 1943, proMachine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Original proceeding by James Robinson
against the City Court for the City of
Ogden, Weber County, State of Utah, and
J. Quill Nebeker, Judge thereof, to prohibit the judge from enforcing a certain
judgment holding the petitioner in contempt of court and sentencing him to a
fine or term in jail.
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jlie Use of the Writ of Prohibition in the State
of Utah as a Means of Intermediary Review.
Justice James H. Wolfe
Of The Supreme Court Of The State of Utah

yhe role of the Writ of Prohibition
a procedure for intermediary review
Lad its birth in necessity. Courts long
v
iaVe recognized that inferior tribunals,
while proceeding strictly within proper
' jurisdictional limits, may nevertheless pro:
ceed so as erroneously to place one qr both
parties in a position from which they cannot retrieve themselves. The damage done
may be irreparable. A pronouncement by
ihe appellate court, correcting the error
may not result in undoing the damage. In
•j896, the year the Constitution of Utah
• became operative, 1 our Supreme Court
Held that article 8, sec. 9 of the
Constitution, which provides that an appeal shall lie ''from all final judgments
of the district courts," was a limitation on
the power of the Supreme Court to entertain appeals. 2 Under this holding
|e court had no power under the Constitution to entertain any appeal other
than from final judgments. This meant,
of course, that the prohibition against
allowing an appeal from other than final
judgments rested, not on <the immemorial
custom or policy of the common law
based on reasons of economy and orderliness of litigation, but on a constitutional inhibition. It meant that the legislature
could not provide for review in cases
where such review was not only highly
desirable from a stand point of economy
of time, effort and expense*but, as we
shall later see, in cases where it was
necessary in order to save a party from
J the results of an action of the lower court
| from which he could not be retrieved.
No matter how palpable the injustice

done or how clearly erroneous the action
of the lower court appeared to be, the
Supreme Court was powerless on appeal
to grant relief until the procedure had
terminated in a final judgment. And this
meant that counsel sometimes had to,
speculate at their peril upon whether a
judgment was final or not—not always
an easy matter as witness the case of Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 9 3 Utah
426, 73 P . ( 2 d ) 1277. In the interlude
between grevious error and final judgment the aggrieved party could suffer injury, and an appeal to correct the holding
after the injury sought to be prevented
had already occurred might be a fruitless
victory.
;
This holding that the Supreme Court
had no jurisdiction to entertain appeals
except from final judgments obtained until
1937, when it was expressly overruled
in Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 9 3

Utah 426,73 P. (2d) 1277. It"is out
of this background that the writ o*f prohibition has^ evolved into a limited writ
of supervisory control and within certain
limits a remedy for intermediate review.
A t this time it is perhaps well to warn
the bar that in any case the writ of prohibition cannot be used as a means of arresting merely erroneous action except
under very limited conditions which we
shall soon consider.
The writ of prohibition is a. common
law writ of ancient origin. "It arose because a variety of courts came into being
whose separate spheres of jurisdiction

(1) Clark
Became
operative
January 4, 1896 by PresiDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
Law School,
BYU.
dential
Proclamation.
See
Anderson v. Tyree, 12
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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wiieii on oepxemoer y, 103U, the
Congress of the United States enacted
" A n act to Establish A Territorial Government for Utah" known as the Organic
Act, no mention was made of the writ
of prohibition. That act provided:

5 might have been desired. If the writ
•as not first originated for the purpose
f restricting the authority of the eccles.stical courts, it acquired its largest use
>r that purpose/' s It is noted in
ollock and Maitlandl, History of Eng"That the judicial power of said tersh Law. Vol. I, p. 129, that from the
ritory
shall be vested in a Supremp Court,
ay of Henry I'l onward the royal court
District Court, Probate Court and in
as always ready to prohibit ecclesiastical
Justices of the Peace. . . The jurisdiction
idges from entertaining certain cases.
of the several courts herein provided for,
aeon introduces his discussion of Proboth appellate and original, and that of j
bition as follows:
probate courts and of Justices of the peace
"As all external jurisdiction, whether
shall be as limited by law* Provided, ^
:clesiastical or civil, is derived from the
own, and the administration of justice ' that. . . . the said Supreme Court and
District courts respectively shall possess
committed to a great variety of courts,
chancery as well - as common law juris:nce it hath been the care of the crown,
diction. . . . and each of said District
at these courts keep within the limits
id bounds of their several jurisdictions Courts shall have and exercise the same
'escribed them by the laws and statutes jurisdiction in all cases arising under the
:
the realm. A n d for this purpose the Constitution and laws of the United States
as is vested in the circuit and district courts
rit of prohibition
was
framed;
of the United States. . ." 5
hich issues out of the superior courts of
>mmon law to restrain the inferior courts,
The Act also expressly provided for the
hether such courts be temporal, eccles- issuance of writs of habeas Corpus but
stical, maritime, military, etc., upon
the othier extraordinary writs of cersuggestion that the cognizance of the tiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and
mandamus were not mentioned. *
I
after belongs not to such courts; and in
Section
4
of
the
Act
vested
the
legisI
,se they exceed their jurisdiction, the oflative power of the Territory in the gov; |
:er who executes the sentence, and in
me cases the judges that give it, are ernor and a legislative assembly, ^ec. 0 1
such superior
courts
punishable, provided that the legislative power "SMH j
metimes at the suit of the king, some- extend ta all rightful subjects of legisl*; |
oes at the suit of the party, sometimes jtion, consistent with the Constitution oj
the suit of both, according to the na- the United States and the provisions J*
this A c t . " In Ferris v. Higley, 20 WaBt*e of the case. . . .
375, 11 L. Ed. 383, in discussing n* j
"The object of prohibition in general
the preservation of the right of the power of the Legislature given by Sec- J
ig's crown and courts, and the ease of the Act the United States Supra* J
j
"^
d quiet of the subjects. For it is the Court said:
sdom and policy of the law, to sup~
" W e may, I think, assume, w * j £
se both best preserved when every thing
much hazard, that defining the juriso* ^
ns in its right channel, according to the
tion of a probate court, or, indeed o
j
tginal jurisdiction of every court; for by
court, may be fairly included ^ ^ f y j j
2 same reason that one court might be
general
meaning of the phrase ng ,J|
owed to encroach, another might; which
subject of legislation."
- ,J
uld produce nothing but confusion and
4
In 1870 the Legislative
^$f^l
>order in the administration
of
justice.*'
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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\ . * and mandamus. 6 This new
• rtment was before the court in Shep•*£ v . District Court, 1 Utah 340. The
hon w a s a n o^S" 1 ^ proceeding for a
*.'t of mandamus. The Territorial Sume Court, after noting that in 1874
I ngress had enacted a statute giving
it Utah district courts "exclusive" orinal jurisdiction in all suits or proceed• o$ in chancery, and all actions at law in
• Ljch the sum or value of the thing in
ontroiversy shall be three hundred dollars
*r upwards, held that it had no original
iurisdiction to issue mandamus.
While
I the holding was later reversed it was in
effect a holding that the Legislative As<embly. for the territory could not grant
lo the Supreme Court original jurisdiction
t0 issue the extraordinary writ of man;ramus except in the aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. The same reasoning would
apply to writs of prohibition and other
extraordinary writs.
This reasoning was in part repudiated
in Maxwell v. Burton, 2 Utah 5 9 5 . In
Young v. Cannon, 2 Utah 560 the territorial Supreme Court held that it had
original jurisdiction under the territorial
Statute to issue the writ of certiorari. Both
of the latter decisions were approved in
People v. Spiers, 4 Utah 353, wherein
die court noted:
I "The conclusion to be drawn from
ttkse decisions is that whether this court
pas, under the organic act, and subsequent acts of Congress, original jurisdiction or not to issue the writs of this class
is not material, as the legislature of the
f territory has authority to give such jurisdiction, and had done so/ 5

tially without change. It provided:
"The writ of prohibition is the counterpart of the writ of mandate. It arrests the
proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board or person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial when such proceedings are without or in excess of the
jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation,
board or person.
"It may be issued by any court except
probate or justices courts to an inferior
tribunal or to a corporation board, or person, in all cases when there is not a
plain speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. . ." 7
This statute was first examined by the
court in Ducheneau v. House, 4 Utah
369, 10 P . 838. The case involved an
attempt by a justice of the peace to pass
upon questions involving the title to real
property, a subject matter over which he
had no jurisdiction. Before the writ issued the justice of the peace had decided the case. All that remained to be done
was to issue execution, which admittedly
was a ministerial act. The contention was
made that the writ of prohibition would
not issue to prohibit the doing of ministerial acts; that it, like the common law
writ, was limited to preventing the exercise of judicial function without jurisdiction. The court held to the contrary. It
said:

"The district courts have general common-law and chancery jurisdiction and
that covers about everything of a civil
or criminal nature not expressly committed
to some other, tribunal: Ferris v. Higley,
20 W a l l 375. W e can readily see that
this general jurisdiction would embrace
The fcower of the Legislative Assem- the common-law writ of prohibition, and
that the legislature could in no? way debly to authorize the issuance of the writ
prive the district courts** of such jurisdicof prohibition was thus expressly upheld.
tion. But the legislature, in pursuance of
Tiie power was exercised in 1884. (L.
its authority given by the organic act to
1884, Sec. 982 and 9 8 3 ) . The statute
legislate upon all 'rightful subjects of
^acted has remained
throughout
all
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jndoubted right, as occasions arise, to
:reate new offenses, new subjects for judicial investigation, and new ways and
neans to enforce the authority of the
:ourts and officers, x and we can see no
eason to conclude that the giving of ad~
litional power to the writ of prohibition
vas not a 'rightful subject of legislaton
The contention that the territorial legdature had no authority to enlarge the
:ope of the common law writ was thus
icpressly overruled.

the ordinary course of the law. In holding the statute unconstitutional, the court
noted:
*'Whether the writ, as defined by the
territorial laws, should be regarded as the
writ of prohibition known to the common law, or as an enlargement of that
writ, need not now be determined. For,
whichever view, may be taken of the question, it is very manifest that the only office of the writ was to prevent usurption
of jurisdiction and to restrain acts in excess of or without jurisdiction, and not to
review proceedings and to correct error,
and that such an office was the only function which the territorial courts had ever
given it. If therefore it is considered that
the writ mentioned in the Constitution is
the writ as it existed under the laws of the
territory, with functions as declared by
the territorial courts, and is the writ as
we knew it, and as it was applied in the
territory when the Constitution was adopted, still the office of the writ, as defined;
by the enactment, is clearly and unquestionably repugnant to the meaning of the
writ. The legislation in question not only
enlarged the office of the writ, but completely changed its character and ^ con*
verted it into a mere writ of review-

State ex rel Robinson v. Durand, 36
Jtah 9 3 , 104 P . 760, was the first
iportant case involving the writ of probition to be decided after the adoption
:
the Utah Constitution. Section 4, Ar:Ie 8 ojf the Constitution had expressly
ven the Supreme Court original jurisdic>n to issue writs of prohibition together
ith the other writs of mandamus, cer>rari, quo warranto and habeas corpus,
hereafter the legislature enacted a state expressly providing for the use of the
r
it c:f prohibition to review the action of
stice's courts in refusing to dismiss proedings shown by special appearance to
ve been commenced in the wrong preict. The said statute obviously permit1 the use of the writ purely as a writ of
The statute was thus held to be unconrriew. Even though the actions were stitutional and the power of legislature to
mmenced in the wrong precinct there expand the scope of the writ was denied*
is no lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The question as to whether the ^ Consti->r was the remedy by appeal inadeate. The court noted that it was un- tution refers to the writ as it existed ^
!e to assent to the principle that the the territory at the time the Constitution
islature could thus enlarge the scope was adopted or to the common law wn-»
was definitely set at rest in "J^L \
the writ. Some doubt was expressed
to whether the writ provided for in v. Lehi City, 74 Utah 3 2 1 , 279 P. 8 ' *
Constitution was the common law The case involved an application to*
t as distinguished from the writ as it writ of prohibition to prevent the ^
>ted in the territory immediately pre- of Lehi from entering into a conditio^
sales contract for the purchase or
ing the adoption of the Constitution,
wever, the court refused to decide tain electrical equipment. The obje ^
question because it held that both the was made that since the act sought _ {
itorial writ and the common law writ enjoined was purely ministerial the ^
the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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' inisterial in nature was unconstitutional,
! kpcause it attempted to extend the scope
j f the writ. T h e court noted several
I ses including Camron v. Kenfield, 57
\fyl 550, and Maurer v. Mitchell, ^53
• 'CaL 289, in which the California SurelBe Court had held that a similar pro, vision in the California Constitution referred to the writ as it existed at the
, common law. Under this holding a Cali: (ornia statute (identical to the Utah territorial statute authorizing the issuance of
jjje writ) was held unconstitutional because it attempted to enlarge the scope
, 0f the common law writ to arrest the do[ jn2; of acts purely ministerial in nature.
|

[ These California cases were distin| auished by the Utah Court because Cali1
fornia had never in its history before statei hood permitted the issuance of a writ
broader in scope than that of the comj mon law. There was no other writ, exI cept the common law writ, to which the
Constitution of California could have
referred.
[

The court further noted in Barnes v.
Lehi City, supra, that had the Utah Organic Act referred specifically to the writ
' of prohibition, it might be argued that
by so specifying the writ, it was intended
to confine its functions to those only attending the common law writ. The court
! concluded:

The court then field mat me wru wouia
properly issue to inferior boards, corporations or persons whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial.
The issuance of the writ to arrest the
performance of a purely ministerial act is
now apparently well established 8 as
is the holding that the writ specified in
the Constitution is the same writ as was
in existence in the territory at the time
the Constitution was adopted—which
writ was somewhat broader in scope than
the common law writ. Note however that
up to this time all of the cases gave lip
service to the principle laid down so emphatically in State v. Durand that the
Constitution froze into the writ of prohibition the requirement that it "be issued
only to arrest proceedings without or iiT)
excess of jurisdiction and that it issue >
only where there was no other remedy; )
that any attempt to enlarge the scope of
the writ so as to eliminate these requirements would be unconstitutional. As already noted, it had been held as early
as 1 896 that the Constitution deprived the
Supreme Court of jurisdiction to entertain appeals except from final judgments.
9
Thus there was no mechanism for
intermediate review. Regardless of the
hardship, if the inferior court had jurisdiction to proceed, the injured litigant
must await a final judgment before proceedings could be had to review error. If
he were compelled to wait final judgment, the threatened injury sought to be
prevented would have occurred and the
litigant would have been placed in a
position from which he could never obtain relief even though he ultimately were
to prevail. The extraordinary writs like

j "We confidently believe that the
| fr&mers of the Constitution in conferring
authority upon the Supreme Court to isI sue the writ of prohibition, had in mind
| a writ the character and functions of
| which were the same as defined by the
| statute of the territory which was then in
j existence, and had been in existence for
(8) Cottrell v. Millard County Drain. Dist.,
56
Utah 375, 119 P. 16.6; Livingston v. Millard
f II years, and which had been recognized County
Drain. Dist. No. 3, 58 Utah 382, 199 P .
I and approved by the courts of the ter- 661 ; Moyle v. Board of Commissioners of Salt
Lake ounty, '53 Utah 35i2, 178 P. 918; Van
I ritory, and thus, as was said by the Su- Orden v. Board of Education of Cache County
Dist., 66 Utah 4!30, 191 P. 230; Booth v.
j'preme Court of South Dakota, in State School
Midvale City, 55 Utah 220, U84 P. 799; Hartley
y. Ewert, 36 S. D . 622, 156 N. W . 90, v. State Road Comm., 53 Utah 589, 174 P. 629;
Olsen v. Merrill, 78 Utah 453, 5 P. 2d 26i&;
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certorari and prohibition could only be
used where the lower tribunal was proceeding without or in excess of jurisdiction. Appeals could only be taken from
Final judgments. * And the Constitution
/vas construed to prohibit the enlargement
)f the scope of the writs and to prohibit
he taking of appeals from anything except final judgments. The result was of
purse inevitable. Lawyers sought means
o stay the harsh results of such "holdigs. The extraordinary writs were tried
ven though there was no want of jurisiction. Courts were inclined to ignore the
ne distinctions between jurisdiction and
rror.
Likewise, when appeals were
rought from intermediate orders, the
>urts were inclined to consider the judgent to be final. The distinction bereen jurisdictional and plain error and
;tween judgments which were final and
ose which were not became confused,
fact even had the line between final
d non-final judgments not been so
irred, it would have in some cases been
tremely difficult to know when one had
appealable judgment.

to the decision. Consequently, that discussion embedded in the Atwood case was
not abstracted in the headnotes and the
case must be read to discover it. However,
the case has been cited man)' times since
in the opinions of our Supreme Court for
its conclusions in this regard.
It is
thought to have become a part of the
law of this jurisdiction.
It was noted that in most cases the
writ had not issued except where a lack of
jurisdiction was shown. Yet:
"In a comparatively small number of
cases where the writ was granted, it was
quite evident that the court was influenced by the fact that if it did not act
to prevent the threatened action by the
lower court, ijrrgmediab]e_. harm woiila
have been jdone. The lower courts either
ignored the distinction between what was
merely error and excess of power or, as
in the Montana case in 5 6 Pacific Re)porter above cited, managed to* see 4an
| erroneous ruling of the lower court as m
I excess of jurisdiction, or else confused
the reasoning^ that it is difficult to determine upon what ground the court aid
decide. In a still smaller number of cases
This state of affairs was analyzed in the line which separated the erroneous
wood v. Cox, 88 Utah 426, 55 P. action of a court in its legitimate judicial
377. In that case there was discussed
field from actions in a field in excess of
length the necessity of the court taking t its powers was so difficult to draw tnat
[nizance, on applications for jprohibi- minds might go one way or the other m
i and certiorari, of errors where the drawing conclusions. . .
sequences of the erroneous ruling
"In-a number of jurisdictions where a
ild otherwise be irremedial. The lack
"threatened interlocutory or intermediate
mechanism for timely review of such
order involving some affirmative action
rigs was noted. It was frankly admitted
of the lower court in reference to prop: this situation had led our Supreme
erty, status, relationship, or rights of Par"
irt and those of practically all other
ties in respect to property was o?f such
>dictions to consider such rulings on
nature as to destroy the status quo an
s of certiorari and prohibiiton where
render an appeal or other remedy &e~
eality only error and not jurisdiction
fectual to undo the mischief, the 'courts
involved.
have issued the writ of prohibition a'fill-in' in order to prevent the threatittention should be called to the fact
]
in this case a majority of the court ened mischief most times not giving ^
not affirmatively concur in the dis- sons therefor except to say categoric* >
on in that case distinguishing jurisdic- that the court below was threatening
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[n conclusion it was noted that the
s could not be reconciled so as to
\~ Jown a definite rule of guidance, but:

"What can be said is that ordinarily
I - Superior court will look only to see
•f the lower court was acting without or
I * excess of jurisdiction, and if so, wheth» [Here is still not some adequate and
! eedy remedy, but that, in certain sitI uations where it would work a palpable
^justice or hardship or cause damage
which could not be checked or remedied
jn any other way, the superior court will
n0t go too refinedly into the questions as
t0 what constitutes error merely or lack
or excess of jurisdiction before issuing
. the writ."
,
Some of the specific illustrations set out
jn Atwood Y, Cox as to when the courts
will and when they will not grant the writ
may better be discussed below. Suffice
it here to note that it was expressly re. cognized in the opinion in Atwood v.
! Cox that the writ of prohibition could
1 under certain named circumstances be used
as a proceeding for an intermediate review
and that in so using the writ courts will
[ not go too 'refinedly into the question of
v
jurisdiction.

ing of the North Point Consol. Orr. Co.
v. Utah & S. L. Canal Co., case, supra,
to the effect that appeals could, under the
Constitution, only be entertained from
final judgments. The hardships resulting
from the lack of some mechanism for an
intermediate review was again discussed*
The court, while still adhering to the ancient and salutary policy of the law
against piecemeal reviews, overruled the
North Point case in so far as it construed the Constitution as limiting the
jurisdiction of the Court to appeals from
only final judgments. The court said:
". . . . we hold that section 9 of ar. tide 8 of the Constitution was a guaranty
and not a restriction on the right of the
litigant to appeal. Likewise, section 1 0441-1, R. S. Utah 1933, was intended
not to prevent this court from ever entertaining an appeal from other than what
is technically a final judgment, but was
meant to assure the right at all events
from final judgments. W e , however, adhere to the doctrine and policy of the
law, as stated by Mr. Justice Lamar in

.McLish v. Pvoff, 141 U. S. 661, 12 S.
Ct. 118, 35 L. Ed. 8 9 3 , 'a case cannot
be brought to this court in fragments' and
that ordinarily a case will be dismissed
where the appeal is not from a final
judgment. . . we do not think a final judgment is a condition precedent to our jurisdiction, but is a condition precedent ex-cept in rare instances to our entertaining
the appeal because of the ancient policy
of the law based on sound principles."

This is perhaps as good a point as any
; to note that in some situations it is quite
difficult to determine whether a requirer merit is a condition to jurisdiction or
• whether it is mandatory on the court
: acting within jurisdiction or for that mat' ter only directionary. Sometimes it may
1
make little difference in the result whethThe situation which prompted the court
] er such distinction is made for as we to entertain the appeal in the Pomeroy
shall see in the matter of issuing a writ of
case is considerably involved and would
prohibition the controlling element is the be difficult to keep in mind if I should
; adequacy of a remedy by appeal. But
attempt to state the situation there inj% in cases of habeas corpus, it may be ne- volved and perhaps not of sufficient mo|: cessary definitely to determine the line ment though the Pomeroy case contains am
[which bounds the area between jurisdicinteresting decision as to what is an ap|-tonal error and error committed within
pealable (final) judgment which subk the. exercise of correctly assumed jurisdic- ject is related to the subject here being
\. tion. See Thompson v. Harris, 1 06 Utah considered. Furthermore it contains some
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Later the court again permitted an
tion Co. v. Hooper Irrigation Co. et al
appeal from an interlocutory judgment
87 U t 5 4 5 ; 51 P . (2d) 1069.
granting a temporary injunction in the
On February 15, 1946, in the case
case of Wellsville East Field Irr. Comof Graham v. Street—Utah—166 P,
pany v. Lindsay Land and Livestock Cq.
(2d) 524 the court again entertained an
et al, 104 Utah 4 4 8 , 137 P . 2d 634.
appeal
from an interlocutory decree orderIn that case the plaintiffs sought injuncing an accounting between partners. The
tive relief to prevent several defendants
court noted that the appeal was enterfrom taking water for irrigation from a
tained
under the authority of Attorney
particular source. After hearing the eviGeneral v. Pomeroy, supra.
dence the court entered its order, which
it denominated an interlocutory order, reIt appears thus to be now firmly esstraining the defendants from using the
tablished that the court will, where the
water. The trial judge then ordered that
facts warrant it, entertain an appeal from [
the case be turned over to the State Enan intermediate order. It also appears that
gineer for a general adjudication of the
the writ of prohibition can be used as an
water rights on the whole stream. The
intermediate writ of review where facts
result was that the defendants, some of
warrant it. The rule is thus stated in
whom had used the water for the past
Mayers v. Bronson, 100 Utah 279, 114 ]
40 years, were enjoined from using it
P . 2d 2 1 3 :
further. No final judgment was entered
" W e have held that even where there
from which they could appeal. The general adjudication procedure is time con- is jurisdiction we will entertain the application for the writ if there is no plain,
summing and it might have taken upwards
of ten years to complete it. Meantime the speedy and adequate remedy at law. Atwood v. Cox, supra, we have also held :
defendants under the order must let their
even where there is no jurisdiction but
farms lie arid unless an appeal from the
a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
interlocutory order was allowed. Defenat law, we will not entertain the writ.
dants appealed and the court denied a
Hense the important question is: Is there
motion to dismiss based on the fact that
an adequate remedy at law?"
the judgment was not a final judgment.
These factors are not discussed in the
And Olson v. District Court, 106
opinion in the Wellsville case. They are
Utah 220, 147 P. 2d. 471, where*
however noted in a concurring opinion in
the court said:
Watson v. District Court,
Utah
163 P . 2d. 322, which involved a writ
"In addition to the purpose above
of prohibition on another phase of the mentioned, the function of the writ
same case. In all probability appeals from prohibition has been extended, under o
certain intermediary judgments in general law, to cover situations where, e
adjudication of river systems would be though the lower tribunal has jurisdiction,
permissible even without the authority of
the court deems it necessary and a
.
the Pomeroy case. Such suits are of long
able to issue the writ to P revent R S °. m j t
duration, take in many facts, contain palpable and irremedial injustice. #
within the over arching suit many inde- is settled beyond dispute that if ^ e .
ol
pendent and local controversies which,
court has jurisdiction, prohibition i* . -/
ike probate procedure, in the very naa proper remedy if a remedy a l \
\
ure of the case require the opportunity
adequate. It requires but a moment s. ^
o appeal and which may be in themflection to reveal that for the rule to \ ;
elves as between the parties
concerned
in Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.any lawsuit *£:•
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Whether the remedy available is ade*** for the most part, rests in the sound
\-rretion
discrete or the court. What is meant
discretion of the court" relative to
by .
1 jssuance of prohibition discussed in
detail in Broadbent v. Gibson, 105

said to have issued in the sound discretion of the court, even though other minds
might have reasonably concluded that the
legal remedy was adequate. But 'sound
discretion' must always be labelled with
the precautionary admonition that the writ
is for extraordinary occasions and should
be sparingly used."
-

5ome

| ^ah 53, 140 P. 2d. 939. The court
i-there.said:

!•/• " 'Discretion' does not mean happy
W e turn now to an examination of
j fortuitous choice, but a discretion guidseme of the factors which control the isr j by circumstances surrounding the liti- suance of the writ. First: it is clearly esaatio<n. If the term 'adequate remedy' tablished that the mere delay and expense
were an absolute, it might be incorrect
of an ordinary appeal affords no grounds
$ say that we could ever grant the writ for the issuance of the writ. This was
where there was another adequate remestated as follows in Construction Sec.
1
Jy. But 'adequate remedy' is a matter Co. v. Dist. Court, 85 Utah 346, 39 P.
i 0f degree and may run the gamut of sit2d 707:
: uatians at one end where he could not
"Where there is an adequate remedy in \
retrieve himself, (Atwood v. Cox) to
situations on the ether hand where not the ordinary course of law, the writ is
jo grant the' writ would leave the peti- not demandable as a matter of right, but
will issue only in the exercise of a sound
••tioner where there were no factors of
hardship other than those which attend judicial discretion. . . (citing cases). . .
the ordinary judgment and appeal. In T o justify a departure from the general
between situations may arise where, in a rule thus announced, some extraordinary
single case at bar, there appears to be a 4 circumstances or extreme emergency or
remedy adequate in the ordinary course necessity must appear, such that the court
ought, in the exercise of a sound discreof the law, but where there are urgent
public questions or question of public tion, to invoke this extraordinary remedy.
policy involved directly or indirectly re- The mere necessary • delay and expense of
an (appeal 'ordinarily furnish no sufficient
lated or dependent upon the outcome, or
wtere the urgent rights of a large group reasons for holding that the remedy
of the public await the resolution of the by appeal is not adequate or speedy. T o
question, or where a multiplicity of suits hold otherwise is to hold that all appeals
are not adequate or speedy, for all inthreaten, or where some factors, either
^
intrinsic or extrinsic to the litigation, re- volve some delay and expense'."
veal the ordinary course of Law really not
And in Broadbent v. Gibson, supra,
k adequate although on the face of things the court noted that "one of the risks
it may technically appear to be. In those of all citizenry is that they must submit
cases the writ may issue in the sound dis- to the law as it is declared until it is
cretion of the court. Perhaps another way
repealed csr found invalid even though it
of stating the proposition would be to say
entails some loss or inconvenience."
,
that such circumstances involve a contradiction and ^actually defeat 'the adeSecond: the lower tribunal must have
quacy of the /remedy at law—render it
its alleged excess of jurisdiction pointed
not so. In the last analysis, adequacy of
out to it and be given an opportunity to
legal remedy may be under certain cir- rule thereon before application' is made
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operative v. Wiesley, 102 Utah 6 0 1 ,
132 P . 2d 384, the writ was refused
even though the court concluded that the
Utah Labor Board had no jurisdiction
to" proceed because no application was
first made to the Bioard for relief. The
:ourt noted:
"If we were to proceed on the theory
:hat the lower tribunal would commit.
*rror when a petitioner properly demanded the protection of his rights, we would
)e required to hold all remedies short of
i'ome action by this court to be inadequate.
. ^. It should be a fundamental canon
)f judicial conduct to avoid interference
vith administrative proceedings until it is
certain that the proceedings which imninently threaten to infringe the rights of
he petitioner will not be corrected by the
idministrative tribunal. Otherwise the
:orurts would be called upon to arrest the
>roceedings of such- tribunals by the use
>f an extraordinary writ even though the
lecessity for the issuance thereof might
^ave been obviated if a proper motion
o dismiss had been made before the said
ribunal. In fact, until the Board acts
otherwise, we will, assume that it will act
orrectly when and if a proper motion
o dismiss is made."
This was. followed in Olson v. Disrict Court, supra, wherein the petitioner
ailed to permit the lower court to rule on
le questions raised before applying for
le writ. See also State ex rel Welling
v Dist.

Court, 87 Utah 416, 49 P." 2d

50, where the court held that the trial
ourt should have been given an opportuny to rule upon the motion for a new trial
efore the writ of prohibition would isle. And Van Cott v. Turner, 88 Utah
35, 56 P . 2d 16, wherein the court
lid that "a writ of prohibition will lie
ily in cases of manifest necessity and
fter a fruitless application for relief to
te inferior tribunal."

Cox, supra, where the court said:
" T h e court to which application for a
writ of prohibition is directed will not try
out the question of the sufficiency of a
complaint or information where the complaint car information states sufficient facts
to apprise the court in which the action
has been brought as to whether it has jurisdiction of the general subject-matter in
respect to which the pleadings seek to invoke its jurisdiction in the particular case
endeavored to be set forth by the pleadings. . . exceptions to this rule have been
made. .• . in criminal cases or in cases
where an accusation is filed to remove a |
public officer from his office;. . .'
However, in Furbreeders Agr. Coop.
v. Wiesley, supra, the court held that be-'t
fore a tribunal of limited jurisdiction the |
pleading -must aver the necessary jurisqio
tional facts and that if the jurisdictiona
facts are not alleged, then the tribunal tas ,.
no jurisdiction to proceed except to decide
that it has no jurisdiction.
It may be incidentally noted that a
petition for a writ of prohibition maybe
treated as an application for an injunction
if it is filed originally with the distnc
court. Broadbent v. Gibson, supra. AW
the writ of prohibition may be treated a>
a writ of certiorari. Clark v. .Bramei,
Utah 146, 192 P . 11 11. See also Hottmanv. Lewis, 31 Utah 179, 87 P. «Wj
And a writ of certiorari may be tre
as a writ of prohibition Thomas VA »*\
Ct. 171 P . 2d 667. It thus appear »
the form of the application for r e l i e f
be generally disregarded and the pe ^
er may be awarded the relief to wni ^
pleadings show that he is entitled so
as the application is filed in a court
ing proper original jurisdiction.

|

|
j
j
J
|
|

Brief reference to the cases m fa
the writ issued serves to demonstra^^
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I Tax Commission subpoena. Petitioner
1 \ imed that he was not required by lav/
Ic
appear. H e applied to the Supreme
r art for prohibition. The contention was
de that he had an adequate remedy
f appeal. The court held to the con0
* because in order to appeal he had
I'fst to refuse to purge himself of the
I nternpt as ordered by the court, that is
refiise to appear before the commission
ke had been ordered to do by the
ourt. If ^e w e r e then held by the SureIpe Court to have been wrong in his
efusal he would have been subject to
'jnprisonment for contempt.
The court
thought that no man need run that risk
| j n order to test his right to refuse to answer to what he considered to be an ille;
cral order.
0

]n Adolpll Coors Co. v. Liquor Control

Commission, 99 Utah 246, 105 P. 2d
|81, the defendant would have been required either indefinitely to comply with
an order of the Liquor Control Commission which he thought to be void or
\o disobey the order and thus hazard
, criminal prosecution and forfeiture of his
license. Possibly he could have had recourse to the declaratory judgment procedure to test the validity of the order,
but this point was neither raised nor discussed.

court without jurisdiction, made the writ
permanent.
The criminal case referred to in Allen
v. Lindbeck, supra, is People v. Spiers,
4 Utah 385, 10 P . 609, U P . 509.
The petitioner there was being tried by
a justice's court for a crime over which
it had no jurisdiction. The defendant applied for a writ of prohibition which issued. The contention was made that the
writ should be dismissed because of the
remedy by appeal. The court said:
" T o compel a party to submit to being
forced through this tedious and harassing
routine of- illegal proceeding and usurped
jurisdiction is not only expensive and
troublesome, but also vexatious in the* exteme, and ought not to be allowed if it
can be prevented. If there be no remedy
by writ of prohibition in a misdemeanor
case, by reason, of there being an appeal,
there is none in a felony case. . . A party
charged with any offense has the right
to have it investigated in a proper court,
and in a logical manner, and cannot be
compelled to submit to an illegal and unauthorized investigation. . . he is entitled
to have a judgment that he may plead
in any subsequent proceedings upon the
same charge. No citizen should be arrested and prosecuted before a court having no authority to hear, try, or determine
the case/'

In Allen v. Lindbeck, 97 Utah 4 7 1 ,
i 93 P. 920, the lower tribunal (a justice
In Home Owners' Loan Gorooration
I of the peace) wras acting without jur~
v. Logan City, 97 Utah ,235, 92 P .
| isdicticn. The Supreme Court noted that
(2d) 346, upon a writ of mandamus it
in such cases it had a discretion to grant
was held that the remedy of paying a
the writ even though it appeared that
sum of money under protest and a suit
there was another adequate remedy. This
to recover it was not an adequate remedy
is, however, limited to cases where the
to compel a municipal corporation to furI lower tribunal is proceeding without or
nish domestic water to an inhabitant of
I in excess of jurisdiction. The case insaid city.
v
I volved a seizure of milk bottles from the
: petitioner and an attempt by a justice's
In Broadbent v. Gibson, supra, and
I court to determine title to the bottles under Washington County •v. County T a x Com.
J an unconstitutional statute. The court not103 Utah 73, 133 P . ( 2 d ) 564, the
| $d that the caseDigitized
had byathequasi-criminal
as- fact that the question presented had a
Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain
errors.interest phase concerning the rights
nublic

not the writ should issue.
By way of summary it would appear
) that if the lower tribunal is without
risdiction or is proceding in excess of
jurisdiction and there is no adequate
nedy, the writ should issue as a matter
right; ( 2 ) if the lower tribunal is
>ceding without jurisdiction, but it ap~
irs that there is an adequate remedy,
writ should generally not issue but the
irt is not entirely without discretion;
Jlen v. Lindbeck, supra, is an exam.) ( 3 ) If the lower tribunal has juristion but it appears that by an erroneous
er it has placed one party in a posii where he will be irreparably injured
! that he has no adequate remedy to
rent the injury or retrieve his loss, then
court may in the exercise of its
id discretion use the writ as a proce2 for intermediate review: (Atwood
^ox, supra; Meyers v. Bronson, supra,
examples) and (4) if there is no
i or excess of jurisdiction and there
h adequate remedy, the writ should

never issue, (State v. Olson, supra, is
example.)
It thus appears that by the cases of
Atwood v. Cox, supra, and subsequent
cases based upon it, together with the
case of Attorney General v. Pomeroy,
supra, the Supreme Court is in position
to. entertain an intermediary review either
through the instrumentality of the writ of
prohibition or by direct appeal from an
interlocutory ruling where the exigencies
of the situation demand it. But the court
will not in any case either grant the writ
no-r entertain an appeal from an interlocutory order where the situation is such*
as will abide the event of final judgment.
In those cases where there is both lack
or excess of jurisdiction and the element
of irretrievability the court grants the writ
or entertains an appeal. In other cases the
entertainment of the appeal before final
judgment or the issuance of the writ will
be in the- discretion of the court, which
discretion will depend on factors dealing'
with irretrievability, hazard and public
interest and importance.

.•far

In the development of our liberty, insistence upon procedural

regularity has

been a large factor."
Justice Louis D. Brandeis
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Article VIII, Section 3. [Jurisdiction of Supreme Court]
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to answer
questions of state law certified by a court of the United States. The Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and power to issue all writs and
orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the complete determination of
any cause.
No History for Constitution
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78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer
questions of state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all
extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs and
process necessary, to carry into effect its orders, judgments,
and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of
Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
fi
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative
proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the School and Institutional Trust Lands
Board of Trustees;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining;
(v) the state engineer; or
(vi) the executive director of the Department of
Natural Resources reviewing actions of the Division
of Forestry, Fire and State Lands;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review
of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under
Subsection (3)(e);
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record
holding a statute of the United States or this state
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the
United States or the Utah Constitution; (h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction
or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony;
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have
original appellate jurisdiction; and
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments,
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas. .
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e 4-803. Trials de novo in small claims cases.
it:

stablish uniform procedures governing trials de novo of small claims actions.
licability:
rule shall apply to the trial de novo of small claims actions.
*mentoftheRule:
leneral provisions.
light to trial de novo. Any party to a judgment in a small claims action may appeal the judgment in accordance with
ion 78-6-10. The appeal shall be by trial de novo.
f

enue. The trial de novo of a justice court adjudication shall be heard in the district court location nearest to and in
ame county as the justice court from which the appeal is taken. The trial de novo from the small claims department
e district court shall be held at the same district court location. Either party may move for a change of venue under
pplicable Rules of Civil Procedure.
mall claims appeals.
iling notice of appeal. Either party may appeal a small claims judgment byfilinga notice of appeal in the court
ng the judgment within ten days of the notice of entry of the judgment.
ontents of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall designate the district court location in which the trial de
will be held, shall specify the parties in their original capacity, shall identify the party obtaining the trial de novo,
shall designate the judgment and the court from which theappeal is taken.
ervice of notice of appeal. The appellant shall give notice of the filing of the notice of appeal by personally serving
ailing a copy to the counsel of record of each party to the judgment, or, if a party is not represented by counsel, then
B party at his last known address. The appellant shall file proof of service or mailing with the district court
ees. At the time of filing the notice of appeal, the appellant must deposit into court issuing the judgment the fees
dished under Utah Code Ann. Section 21-1-5 and Section 78-6-14. The payment of the filing fee is necessary for
wring jurisdiction upon the district court. Payment of filing fees may be waived upon filing of an affidavit of
cuniosity pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 21-7-3.
tay of judgment. A judgment is automatically stayed upon the filing of a notice of appeal with the court issuing the
nent and the posting of a supersedeas bond with the district court. The stay shall continue until the entry of the
nent or final order of the district court.
rocedures - Record of justice court. Within ten days of thefilingof the notice of appeal in a justice court, the court
transmit to the district court the notice of appeal, the district court fees, a certified copy of the docket or register of
ns, and the original of ail pleadings, notices, motions, orders, judgment, and other papers filed in the case.
rders governing trials de novo. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal, the district court shall issue all further orders
rning the trial de novo.
isposition. The trial de novo shall be tried in accordance with the procedures of small claims actions. The
cement, collection or satisfaction of a judgment shall be according to district court procedures. Upon the entry of
idgment or final order of the district court, the clerk of the district court shall transmit to the justice court which
*red the original judgment notice of the manner of disposition of the case. Such notice shall be for informational
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
>sesonly
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legality of the restraint. An answer to a petition shall stat
plainly whether the respondent has restrained the perso:
alleged to have been restrained, whether the person so re
strained has been transferred to any other person, and if sc
the identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, and th
reason or authority for the transfer. Nothing in this paragraph
shall be construed to prohibit the court from ruling upon th
petition based upon a dispositive motion.
(b)(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person allege*
Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief.
to be restrained will be removed from the court's jurisdictio]
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and or will suffer irreparable injury before compliance with th
adequate remedy is available, a person may petition the court hearing order can be enforced, the court shall issue a warran
for extraordinary relief on any of the grounds set forth in directing the sheriff to bring the respondent before the court t
paragraph (b) (involving wrongful restraint on personal lib- be dealt with according to law. Pending a determination of t h
erty), paragraph (c) (involving the wrongful use of public or petition, the court may place the person alleged to have beei
corporate authority) or paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful restrained in the custody of such other persons as may b«
appropriate.
use of judicial authority, the failure to exercise such authority,
and actions by the Board of Pardons and Parole). There shall
(b)(8) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the respon
be no special form of writ. Except for instances governed by dent cannot be found, or if it appears that a person other thai
Rule 65C, the procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings the respondent has custody of the person alleged to be re
on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the extent that this strained, the hearing order and any other process issued h
rule does not provide special procedures, proceedings on the court may be served on the person having custody in tin
petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed by the manner and with -the same effect as if that person had beei
procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules.
named as respondent in the action.
(b)(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone havinj
(b) Wrongful restraints on personal liberty.
(b)(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, custody of the person alleged to be restrained avoids service o
this paragraph shall govern all petitions claiming that a the hearing order or attempts wrongfully to remove the persoi
person has been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty, and from the court's jurisdiction, the sheriff shall immediately
the court may grant relief appropriate under this paragraph. arrest the responsible person. The sheriff shall forthwitl
(b)(2) Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced bring the person arrested before the court to be dealt witl
by filing a petition with the clerk of the court in the district in according to law.
(b)(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that th<
which the petitioner is restrained or the respondent resides or
court orders a hearing, the court shall hear the matter in i.
in which the alleged restraint is occurring.
(b)(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition summary fashion and shall render judgment accordingly. The
shall contain a short, plain statement of the facts on the basis respondent or other person having custody shall appear witl
of which the petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the the person alleged to be restrained or shall state the reason*
respondent and the place where the person is restrained. It for failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct th<
shall state the cause or pretense of the restraint, if known by respondent to bring before it the person alleged to be re
the petitioner. It shall state whether the legality of the strained. If the petitioner waives the right to be present at th<
restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding hearing, the court shall modify the hearing order accordingly
and, if so, the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior The hearing order shall not be disobeyed for any defect of forn
proceeding. The petitioner shall attach to the petition any or any misdescription in the order or the petition, if enough ii
legal process available to the petitioner that resulted in stated to impart the meaning and intent of the proceeding ti
restraint. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a the respondent.
(c) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority.
copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior
(c)(1) Who may petition the court; security. The attorne;
proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the restraint.
(b)(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not general may, and when directed to do so by the governor shall
set forth argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition the court for relief on the grounds enumerated in thi
petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, paragraph. Any person who is not required to be represents
by the attorney general and who is aggrieved or threatened b;
two copies of which shall be filed with the petition.
(b)(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the peti- one of the acts enumerated in subparagraph (2) of thi
tion, if it is apparent to the court that the legality of the paragraph may petition the court under this paragraph if (A
restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, the person claims to be entitled to an office unlawfully held b
or if for any other reason any claim in the petition shall appear another or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a petitioi
frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order under this paragraph after receiving notice of the person5
dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on its claim. A petition filed by a person other than the attorne
face and the reasons for this conclusion. The order need not general under this paragraph shall be brought in the name c
state findings of fact or conclusions of law. The order shall be the petitioner, and the petition shall be accompanied by a
sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment fc
costs and damages that may be recovered against the peti
terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal.
(b)(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed tioner in the proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form fo
as being frivolous on its face, the court shall direct the clerk of bonds on appeal provided for in Rule 73.
(c)(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be grantee
the court to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any
memorandum upon the respondent by mail. At the same time, (A) where a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully hold
the court may issue anDigitized
order bydirecting
the respondent to or exercises a public office, whether civil or military, a frar
the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
chise,
or an office in a corporation created by the authority c
answer or otherwise respond to the petition,
specifying OCR,
a time
Machine-generated
may contain
errors.
within which the respondent must comply. If the circum- the state of Utah; (B) where a public officer does or permit
(e)(4) There is a substantial likelihood that the applicant
will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim, or the case
presents serious issues on the merits which should be the
subject of further litigation.
(f) Domestic relations cases. Nothing in this rule shall be
construed to limit the equitable powers of the courts in
domestic relations cases.

>) Upon full payment of the judgment including post-judgment costs and
rest, the prevailing party shall promptly file a Satisfaction of Judgment
•m J) with the court.
) The court may enter a Satisfaction of Judgment at the request of a party
r ten calendar days notice to all parties.
led effective November 1, 2001.)

le 12. Appeals.
) Either party may appeal a small claims judgment within ten business
3 (not counting weekends and holidays) of receipt of notice of entry of
pnent.
) To appeal, the appealing party must file a Notice of Appeal (Form K) in,
court issuing the judgment and mail a copy to each party. The appropriate
mist accompany the Notice of Appeal.
) On appeal, a new trial will be held ("trial de novo").
led effective November 1, 2001.) legally incorporated; (D) where any corporation has violated
:

the laws of the state of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or renewal of corporations; or (E) where any corporation
has forfeited or misused its corporate rights, privileges or
-• • • franchises.
(c)(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition,
the court may require that notice be given to adverse parties
before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order
requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on the
A
i " /_ _ '
\
merits. The court may also grant temporary relief in accor< ^ T \ O T\ O T
. dance with the terms of Rule 65A.
(d) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply
with duty; actions by board of pardons and parole.
(d)(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose
interests are threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this
paragraph may petition the court for relief.
(d)(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted:
(A) where an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer
exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or
abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has failed to perform an act
required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; (C) where
an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person
has refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or
office to which the petitioner is entitled; or (D) where the
Board of Pardons and Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or
failed to perform an act required by constitutional or statutory
law.
(d)(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition,
the court may require that notice be given to adverse parties
before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order
requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on the *
merits. The court may direct the inferior court, administrative
agency, officer, corporation or other person named as respondent to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the
proceedings. The court may also grant temporary relief in
theClark
terms
RuleBYU.
65A.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunteraccordance
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of review.
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - TOOELE COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLIFTON PANOS,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
PTC/ MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.

Case No: 038300082 ST

JENNIFER ANN CASTLE,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

RANDALL SKANCHY
March 17, 2003

tawnil

PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): CLIFTON PANOS
Defendant's Attorney(s): RICHARD N BARNES
Video
Tape Number:
2003-017
Tape Count: 3:21

HEARING
This matter comes now before the court for pretrial on trial de
novo and for hearing on plaintiff's motion to dismiss appeal.
The Court having heard argument from respective parties, denies
the motion to dismiss the appeal. Trial de novo is set for 4-8-03
at 9:00 am.
The parties are aware that this matter is double-set,
and they are to keep in contact with this court.
TRIAL DE NOVO is scheduled.
Date: 04/08/2003
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Room 321
TOOELE COUNTY COURTHOUSE
47 SOUTH MAIN
Before Judge: TOOELE, UT 84 074
RANDALL SKANCHY
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - TOOELE COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CLIFTON PANOS,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
TRIAL DE NOVO

vs.

Case No: 038300082 ST

JENNIFER ANN CASTLE,
Defendant,

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

RANDALL SKANCHY
April 8, 2003

tawnil

PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): CLIFTON PANOS
Defendant(s): JENNIFER ANN CASTLE
Defendant's Attorney(s): RICHARD N BARNES
Video
Tape Number:
2 0 03-022
Tape Count: 9:52

TRIAL
Mr. Panos argues motion for reconsideration re dismissal of
appeal. The Court, having heard argument from respective parties,
denies dismissing the appeal from justice court.
The trial de
novo is to proceed.
Mr. Panos proffers his testimony. He is sworn and questioned on
cross examination by Mr. Barnes.
Officer Jorge Chiclo and Jennifer Ann Castle testify on direct
examination by Mr. Barnes and cross examination by Mr. Panos.
Defendant's exhibits #1-7 are received.
COUNT: 11:07
Mr. Panos and Mr. Barnes present closing argument.
COUNT: 11:22
The Court states findings on the record. The Court finds the
plaintiff has not met the burdon of proof, and finds no cause of
action in favor of the defendant. This matter is dismissed.
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